An International Think Tank Report on Security in Europe

Editors
Pascal Lago and Fabian Schnell
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Disclaimer
We would like here to thank our external authors, who through their additional European perspectives, turned this report into an anthology. Responsibility for the contents lies solely with the corresponding authors.

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An International Think Tank Report on Security in Europe
Introduction

Changing global circumstances are presenting powerful grounds for Europe to take greater responsibility for its future defense. To that end, this collection of essays is designed to illustrate the challenges and opportunities for transatlantic security cooperation on the European continent.

The end of the Cold War was not, as Fukuyama expected, the end of history. Recent years have seen a shift from a multilateral to a multipolar world. The reasons for this new state of affairs include China’s ascent as a military-political power and an altered risk outlook encompassing hybrid forms of conflict, terrorism, and cyberwarfare between state and non-state actors.

Particularly relevant for Europe is the new US tendency to withdraw from its role of global leadership. Until now, collective security in Europe has depended heavily on the US, institutionalized through the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO). Today, however, relations with the alliance partner Washington are less certain, while NATO remains overshadowed by the ongoing debate about burden sharing (cf. chapter 8 in this report). The US will continue to stress the need for NATO partners to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. Proof of the underlying tensions and uncertainties was provided by French president Emanuel Macron’s description of NATO as “braindead” and his argument that Europe should have the capacity to defend itself as it could no longer rely on the protection of the US and NATO.

The current US president is undoubtedly playing a prime role in such developments. But it would be wrong to ascribe Europe’s altered security requirements solely to him. America’s strategic focus has for years been shifting towards Asia. This transatlantic divergence can be understood as a trend of the past 30 years – in other words, a long-term structural shift in geopolitical interests.

Efforts by the European Union to strengthen its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) should be seen against this background. The EU global strategy of 2016 provided the basis for new European defense initiatives, particularly Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund. Along with a new Capability Development Plan, the EU has identified priorities, which are then to be implemented by member states within the PESCO framework.

But these new initiatives are controversial, both in terms of their design and implementation, due to the lack of a clear Europe-wide security policy strategy. EU member states are divided over both the style and extent of cooperation with the
US and over their security policy focus. For the eastern Europeans, for example, the greatest threat stems from potential Russian aggression. For France, by contrast, the main problem is international terrorism and Europe’s unsettled southern flank. Meanwhile Poland and the Baltic states see NATO with the US as their only reliable guarantors of security and view France’s idea of a greater decoupling of Europe from the US as an existential danger. And while the US has called out China as new military threat, Europe is more hesitant, for fear of endangering economic interests in the east.

As some contributions to this report show, the new threats, which concern every country in Europe, could become a common denominator linking the differing security policy interests. Switzerland, a neutral state in the middle of Europe, is also affected. Surrounded by NATO members and neutral Austria, the Swiss, like their fellow Europeans, are ever less threatened by classical armed attacks from their neighbors, and much more by terrorism, new hybrid forms of warfare, cyber attacks and hostile intelligence agencies. Such new risks pay no heed to national borders or officially declared neutrality and cannot be addressed by a military mandate alone. A broader approach is necessary, taking account of civil, military and political institutions. Even if Switzerland itself is also still finding it difficult to formulate a unified security strategy, it can still reinforce transnational cooperation on the European continent via its peace missions and its soft power tools (strong diplomacy, open economy, hub of financial and political institutions) (cf. chapter 1 in this report).

Against the background of such differing security policy interests, this report highlights European security cooperation from the perspective of selected countries. May we thank here all our external contributors who have shared their broader European points of view.

Chapter 1 shows the importance for Switzerland of collective security in Europe in view of the altered risks. In the civilian sphere, the country already works closely with its European partners. But militarily, there is still considerable room for manoeuvre. Swiss neutrality is not a barrier here. The country could in fact benefit from greater internationalism. Not only for Europe as a whole, but for Switzerland in particular, what is missing is a clear security policy strategy to systematically analyze the state of risks, introduce prioritized responses and provide detailed and transparent costings.

Chapter 2 focuses on Sweden and shows how a (post-)neutral country responds to an immediate security threat. The contribution also highlights the overlapping cooperative ventures and the unclear direction of the EU’s security policy.
Chapter 3 examines the challenge of Brexit for EU security policy. Britain’s military power makes it one of the most important countries in Europe. London has an internationally oriented strategy weighted heavily towards NATO and the US. In military-political terms, Britain would like to remain involved with the EU, but will barely be able to fulfill that wish after Brexit. The contribution weighs up how far the role of the UK as a NATO member could, despite Brexit, lead to greater consensus within the EU.

Chapter 4 shows how Poland exemplifies the “Central European State” that, by spending heavily on defense, reacts to the threats from the east. As a strong supporter of NATO, Poland also relied on the EU for several years in terms of military policy, because it perceived the EU and NATO as a single entity. But the contribution shows that Poland’s initially positive politico-military approach to the EU has increasingly turned into skepticism.

Chapter 5 sets out to describe how Greece feels threatened by Turkey. That comes alongside the unusual circumstances of Turkey being a member of NATO, but not of the EU. As a result, Greece hopes for greater protection from the EU security architecture and is committed to the EU as an important security actor.

Chapter 6 provides an Italian perspective and shows that, for Rome, north Africa is the main concern. Italy has an international approach to security policy, both via NATO and the EU.

Chapter 7 argues greater German engagement in European defense is necessary, but that this is currently not favored by the German public, meaning the necessary resources are blocked.

Chapter 8 finally looks at the debate on burden sharing in NATO, known as the “2 percent debate.” In the context of German-US relations, it is argued that the 2 percent goal should not just include pure defense spending, but also embrace military “readiness” as a central variable in the discussion about burden sharing. The author argues this “new narrative” should be propagated in the security policy debate.

A concluding chapter draws out and sums up the main themes and observations of the preceding sections. Let us here note that the report will be published as part of Avenir Suisse’s international Think Tank Summit on “The Future of Transnational Security on the European Continent” to be held on 16 and 17 January at Zurich Airport.
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1 _ Switzerland: Perspectives for a More Transnational Swiss Security Policy

By Pascal Lago, Avenir Suisse, Switzerland

1.1 _ No Swiss Security without Transnational Cooperation

This section will set out the main characteristics of Switzerland as an international security actor and show how its major security challenges require more transnational security cooperation.

What kind of an international actor is Switzerland?

Switzerland is surrounded by member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and neutral Austria. As far as international law is concerned, it has the status of a neutral country and is neither in NATO nor the European Union (EU). Switzerland also hosts many international institutions and provides well-recognized good offices to other states. As Table 1-1 shows, in comparison to other neutrals like Austria and Ireland, it relies on equal or bigger defense expenditures as a share of GDP and a higher number of military personnel (SIPRI 2019). Moreover,

Table 1-1
Swiss military expenses and personnel in comparison, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military expenses, purchasing power adjusted in US$m</th>
<th>Share of GDP</th>
<th>Military expenses per capita, in current US$</th>
<th>Soldiers per 1000 residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI (2019), demographic statistics of each country, own calculation

---

1 The comparison with the other neutrals, Sweden and Finland, is not being made, since both share a long border with Russia and are thus in a very different geopolitical setting. Both countries have also been far more active in NATO operations than the other neutrals (Cotey 2018).
Switzerland: Perspectives for a More Transnational Swiss Security Policy

Figure 1-1
Swiss military expenses on the rise

Compared to other neutral countries of similar size and geographic situation like Austria or Ireland, Switzerland clearly spends more money per capita for its military.

Source: SIPRI (2019), own calculation

Figure 1-1 shows that, like Austria and Ireland, Switzerland has been increasing its military expenditures per capita in the past twenty years.

Switzerland relies on a mix of hard power capabilities (conscription, relatively high expenditure) and soft power tools (open economy, hub of financial and political institutions, strong peacebuilding diplomacy), which the political scientist Joseph S. Nye describes as “smart power” (Nye 2010).

Switzerland’s values and interests overlap largely with the three main European security institutions (EU, OSCE, NATO). Promoting values like liberal democracy, human rights, arms control, peacebuilding and the rule of law are a vital part of both Swiss and European partners’ interests (Nünlist 2018, EDA 2019). Hence, as far as values and interests are concerned, Switzerland’s security policy cannot be described as non-European. However, identity-wise Switzerland’s self interpretation as a “special case” creates the impression of a highly distinct foreign and security policy actor. The following sections will address perspectives for more, deeper and intensified cooperation between Switzerland and
its closest security partners in terms of values, and identify constraints inhibiting such cooperation.

The following section will start this discussion and show that the shift in security risks makes security policy genuinely transnational.

What are the main security challenges for Switzerland?
The annual report of the Federal Intelligence Service on the “Security of Switzerland” identified the main challenges in 2019: an increased terrorist threat; intensive intelligence activities and cyber attacks on the Swiss economy by China, Russia and others (NDB 2019). As outlined in table 1-2, security risks shift over time from dangers of a conventional armed attack from the former Soviet Union to conflicts between states and non-state actors, in which cyber attacks and hybrid warfare become more prominent. National security can no longer be understood as an exclusive mandate of the armed forces. Rather, a more comprehensive approach between civil institutions, the military and political institutions is needed.

The world order is also changing as multilateralism loses significance, and competition between the US, China, Russia and Europe intensifies. The need for non-proliferation and the sheer attractiveness of high-tech weapons of mass destruction remain high. Switzerland’s most recent federal security policy report shares the intelligence service’s assessments that, while disinformation and propaganda as such are not entirely new, they are becoming the most prominent hybrid threat and, therefore, play a vital part in cyber operations (Bundesrat 2016). Switzerland’s national security depends greatly on a stable Europe (NDB 2019), particularly with regard to crime (theft, organized crime, human trafficking). Therefore, Switzerland needs to cooperate with its European partners because the shift in security risks makes security policy transnational. In a complex and interconnected world, this kind of security policy will, however, depend on a broad and interdisciplinary understanding of security and might lead to a revision of current strategies and the role of the Swiss militia army.

Swiss Security through international civilian and military cooperation
Despite the low probability of a conventional state-led armed attack on Switzerland, the country still needs its armed forces for its ultimate defense. Since current security risks are very dynamic, the prioritization of security measures needs to be strategically adaptable to be effective. That has implications for military planning. The Swiss military must continuously adapt based on changing security risks: if Swiss military security strategy erroneously stuck to an outdated security risk situation,
### Table 1-2
Changing security challenges facing Switzerland over time

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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>The Cold War</td>
<td>The War on Terror</td>
<td>New technologies and hybrid warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst-case scenario</td>
<td>Armed, interstate conflicts using nuclear weapons, proliferation of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction, proliferation of nuclear weapons, failed state with nuclear weapons</td>
<td>End of the multilateral system, autonomous nuclear weapons systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>State and non-state actors</td>
<td>State and non-state actors, tech-industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>The shifting of the major security risks</td>
<td>Cold War, East-West confrontation, the risk of a war with the Soviet Union</td>
<td>Risks of terrorist attacks and conflicts within states</td>
<td>Intensive intelligence activities and cyber attacks, increased terrorist threat, organized international crime, security implications of climate change</td>
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<td>Impact on security policy measures</td>
<td>East-West block building, military measures with regard to conventional, armed wars. Ground-air defense, designed for a war with the Soviet Union</td>
<td>Conventional military measures. Complemented by an integrated approach: interplay between political, diplomatic, economic, police and military measures</td>
<td>Increased security complexity calls for an even stronger integrated approach and for transnational cooperation</td>
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</table>

Sources: Lezzi (2011); NDB (2019); own representation

It would be overtaken by reality and, eventually, lose relevance and popular support (Pulli 2018).

It is also important to point out that international cooperation cannot comprise military coordination alone. The security challenges of terrorism and organized crime are mostly covered by the federal police and intelligence services, while the military provides subsidiary support. The roles and competences of civil and military institutions may overlap, as table 1-3 shows. To prevent duplication, the responsibilities of the relevant institutions need to be addressed.

In what follows, we discuss the main barriers currently inhibiting more intensified transnational security cooperation, which lie in domestic politics: values like autonomy, sovereignty and neutrality are core pillars of Swiss identity. The federal administration’s caution in formulating

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2 Being located in the middle of Europe, the security challenges of Switzerland are mostly congruent with those of western Europe (NDB 2019).
Table 1-3
Switzerland’s current security challenges and its security instruments

<table>
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<th>Main security risks</th>
<th>Security Instruments</th>
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<td>Unsteady stability in Europe and the erosion of the multilateral world order</td>
<td>Switzerland’s traditional good offices and military peacebuilding missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber attacks, foreign intelligence activities and hybrid conflicts</td>
<td>Civil and military cooperation of intelligence agencies, the police and military experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism, organized crime</td>
<td>Mainly civilian cooperation of intelligence agencies and the federal police</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Official security reports must be understood in this political context. This may explain, why Swiss security policy lacks strategic vision regarding the Swiss military and civilian resources used. That is why this chapter will not only focus on suggestions for future transnational security cooperation, but also plead for a more rational discussion of Swiss security cooperation.

1.2 Switzerland’s Cautious Transnational Security Cooperation

Civil institutions like the federal police and the federal intelligence agency already cooperate extensively with their European partners, while military cooperation, mainly in its form of peacebuilding missions, has room for improvement.

Cross-border security cooperation is of civilian nature

Operational, actual, cross-border security cooperation was empirically investigated by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) by interviewing 600 security employees of the major Swiss security bodies about their international cooperation behavior and by conducting a network analysis (Hagmann et al. 2016).

The most frequently targeted international partner organizations, ranked from most to least frequent, were primarily civilian institutions:

01 Police, border guards and customs offices in neighboring countries
02 Civilian European security architectures such as Europol
03 Specialized UN agencies
04 Police stations of other European countries; foreign armies; Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO
While Switzerland’s intelligence service, and police in particular, are highly connected with their European partner institutions, the Swiss military is comparatively less internationally embedded. The police and border guard can be seen as a best practice example of Swiss pragmatism, linking traditional elements of national identity with novel methods of international cooperation. International police work is coordinated by the Federal Police (Fedpol) but always takes place at cantonal level, too. That can happen via cross-border cantonal operations, the use of integrated European information systems (Schengen Information System) or assistance in global criminal prosecution. Thus, Swiss federalism does not inhibit international cooperation, but allows integrated police and border control work.

The military is less intertwined with its foreign partners, mainly because of its primary domestic security mission (Bundesrat 2016). However, there are notable Swiss military peacebuilding missions abroad.

**Swiss cross-border military cooperation is characterized by restraint**

As a neutral country with a strong emphasis on non-involvement and non-alignment, Switzerland has traditionally been wary of military cooperation. Switzerland cooperates “softly” with its European partners and focuses primarily on peacebuilding missions (Pulli 2018).

Switzerland started to engage in peacebuilding missions and diplomatic activities as early as 1953, when the Federal Council sent 146 armed soldiers to Korea to participate in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea (NNRC) and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (NNSC).

According to current Swiss military law, each foreign deployment of military or civilian personnel needs a UN Security Council or OSCE mandate (EDA 2019). As Table 1-4 shows, 226 mainly military experts are currently deployed on EU, NATO or OSCE missions abroad. Relative to Switzerland’s total military manpower of 158,435, barely 0.1 percent are deployed abroad. Compared with Sweden, Finland, Austria or Ireland, Switzerland’s contribution to international peacekeeping offers considerable room for expansion (Nünlist 2018). The institutional ties are already in place: within NATO’s 1996 PfP framework, Switzerland contributed 190 soldiers to KFOR in Northern Kosovo. Moreover, the Framework Partnership Agreement with the EU allows Switzerland to take part in EU missions selectively. Nevertheless, why is Switzerland reluctant to work more with its European partners?

**Factors behind Swiss military restraint**

There are multiple reasons for Swiss restraint. First, the current Swiss militia army
model complicates foreign deployments, because Swiss soldiers are available only for limited periods. Thus Switzerland has difficulty providing troop contingents meeting the specific operational requirements of lasting foreign deployments (Lezzi 2011).

Second, the Swiss feel very secure and have not been plagued by major wars, contributing potentially to a lack of conflict awareness. Switzerland’s location in the heart of Europe, surrounded by western democratic states, provides a high degree of security (NDB 2019). Unlike the Baltic countries, or states like Poland and Ukraine, Switzerland is not affected by Russian ambitions to regain great power status. Moreover, the 136,000 refugees who arrived in Europe in 2018 first landed in Spain, Italy and Greece. Opinion data reveals that 95 percent of Swiss feel secure at home and only 5 percent feel a little insecure (Szvircsev et al. 2019).

Third, and most important, autonomy, sovereignty and neutrality are core pillars of Swiss identity. Every year, the ETH Zurich publishes a survey of security policy issues. The 2019 edition showed the majority of Swiss surveyed were in favor of more international cooperation – but only if undertaken without institutional ties affecting sovereignty (Szvircsev et al. 2019). The majority (78 percent) supported Switzerland’s greater humanitarian commitment at international conferences, as well as increased mediation in conflicts (72 percent), an increase in development aid (65 percent) and the need for Switzerland to make peacekeeping forces available to the UN (60 percent). However, as soon as national autonomy was restricted, respondents showed significant reservations. Most of

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**Table 1.4**

Currently deployed Swiss Military or Civilian Personnel (status June 2019; EU, NATO and OSCE missions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Personnel type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civil Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Civilian Police Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>OSCE-TCG</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Experts (allrounder)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>OSCE-SMM</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Experts (allrounder)</td>
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</table>

Sources: SWISSINT (2019)
those questioned (65 percent) rejected any closer relationship with NATO.

This paradigm of autonomy, sovereignty and neutrality affects political institutions, too. In a semi-direct democratic system, the government is sensitive to public opinion and therefore cautious about topics that may encounter opposition in a referendum. This affects the whole process of foreign and security policy-making. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the question of when a salient issue is brought to a popular vote can be more important than the issue itself. A famous example was Switzerland’s failed UN accession in 1986, where three quarters of the population voted against. In 2002, the same issue was brought up again, with this time 55 percent of voters in favor. The Federal Council has to find the right moment for introducing topics touching on core pillars of national identity. This may help to explain why the Federal Council emphasized the importance of autonomy in its recent security strategy and why it hesitated to prioritize security risks (Bundesrat 2016). However, the strategic road ahead is unclear.

Swiss security strategy – unclear road ahead

Evaluating whether current claims for autonomy and neutrality increase or decrease Swiss security raises interesting questions. What are the costs and benefits of autonomy, neutrality and transnational cooperation in political and financial terms? Although Switzerland has followed the guiding principle of “security through cooperation” in its federal security reports since 2010, it did not establish it on a strategic level (Lezzi 2018).

The 2016 federal security policy report reflects the fragmented security policy interests and the shared competences among the cantons, the federal government, parliament and the different players at federal level (Bundesrat 2016). The report outlines the new multipolar world, the terrorist threat and new hybrid warfare with disinformation and cyber warfare. While security bodies, such as the army, foreign policy, intelligence service and the police are mentioned, security risks are simply discussed in sequence without setting clear priorities based on a systematic situation analysis. Nor is there any prioritization between individual security bodies and measures. In a nutshell, there is no long-term Swiss security policy strategy.

Of course, it is not always easy to predict new, hybrid, technology-driven conflicts with any precision about their likelihood or possible security impact (Lezzi 2011). However, this is not an argument to justify the status quo: uncertainty requires political flexibility and therefore a clear strategic vision. With regard to complex security challenges, it is essential to be adaptable and remain capable of action. What is required is a more comprehensive
approach to security policy, including the military, but also civil institutions, to ensure an efficient and effective security architecture.

The use of resources says a lot about strategic priorities. Switzerland’s overall government security expenditure by task area is publicly accessible (EFV 2019): In 2018, Switzerland’s total security spending accounted for 8 percent of federal government spending, or 5.5 billion Swiss francs, of which 82 percent comprised military expenditure, 8 percent police and intelligence service, 7 percent border controls and 3 percent national security cooperation (population protection and civil service).

However, greater cost transparency would be a first step towards a more goal-oriented discourse about the strategic road ahead. Usually, Swiss federal reports end with an analysis of the financial impact of a proposed strategy to be transparent about the concrete changes the Federal Council is planning. The public should know what means (time and financial resources) are currently used in which security domains and to what end their use is being made.

1.3 _ Réduit Was Yesterday – Opportunities for More Transnational Security Cooperation

As the previous section has shown, there is room for more transnational security cooperation and for improvement in devising a clear strategic profile. The following sections aim at fostering debate about opportunities for a more active, transparent and comprehensive security policy.

**The need for a Swiss security policy strategy**

According to the security policy body at the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport, it is a political challenge to formulate security reports in a more strategic way because the more such reports announce new policies and long-term strategic roads ahead, the more controversially they will be received by parliament and the public (Pulli 2019). It is argued that these political challenges, caused by influential political stakeholders, provoke strategic caution at the federal level. However, exactly such discussions, in parliament and with the public, are of upmost importance – precisely because they are so controversial. They would be an opportunity for developing and reforming the Swiss security landscape.

An empirical security risk and strategy evaluation would offer a starting point for a factual discussion of Switzerland’s international engagement. It might gradually reduce domestic skepticism towards greater transnational cooperation with other European countries. Such a comprehensive analysis should be provided by the next Swiss security policy report.
To ensure both efficiency and effectiveness, future security strategy should be based on risk analysis prioritizing the most pressing security dangers (short-, mid- and long-term). It should prioritize the relevant security policy instruments and measures to meet those challenges. The Federal Council could use the opportunity to be more transparent about the resources used. Based on a systematic security risk analysis, it should deduce which security policy instruments (armed forces, foreign policy, police, intelligence agencies) should receive how much public money and why.

A higher degree of detailed long-term cost transparency would enable an important public debate about the allocation of resources and the strategic security road ahead. Crucial questions could be raised and tackled: what are the real security risks facing Switzerland and how should the country respond? Is it appropriate to invest in new military hardware on a big scale, or would public money be better spent strengthening cybersecurity? Should the military be more involved in cyber defense, or should the police be given greater competence and resources to tackle terrorism? Does our definition of neutrality and autonomy protect us and, if so, from which kinds of threats? Given the shift in security risks, can Switzerland be and remain autonomous? Is it nowadays even possible to defend oneself without the help of partners? This is also a legitimacy argument, because not knowing in detail how state institutions invest public money may decrease the legitimacy of, for example, the army.

Switzerland is still more secure than most other countries. But the public should be informed about the fiscal impact of security policy decisions to evaluate each move on its merits. This kind of transparency is all the more valuable given government budgets may change because of, say, prioritizing infrastructure investments, demography or financing the pension system.

The need for a new security staff unit (Sicherheitsrat) within the Swiss Federal Administration

On the governmental level, Switzerland’s security policy is fragmented and currently organized interdepartmentally by the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport (army and intelligence services); the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (foreign policy); the Federal Finance Department (border protection and custom services); and the Federal Department of Justice and Police (Federal police). The distribution of responsibilities and power is at the heart of Swiss political culture. However, it should not hinder an efficient security organization at federal level. According to the Security Policy body at the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport, this fragmented responsibility within the federal depart-
ments is one reason why Swiss security policy cannot be planned meticulously (Pulli 2019). That would start from a basic report, and continue to a special strategic report – for example on peacebuilding – and then progress to reform of the individual security policy instruments, so that the overall costs could then be presented.

Implementing Swiss security strategy more cost effectively and with greater organizational efficiency requires reorganizing the Federal administration. Austria’s Security Council (“Sicherheitsrat”) could serve as an example (Bundeskanzleramt 2019). In Switzerland this new unit could be called the “security staff unit” (Sicherheitsrat). While the exclusive competencies of the Federal Council would remain unchanged, the new unit could be tasked with proposing short- and long-term strategic security direction to the Federal Council. The unit could thereby manage the current fragmented structure more coherently.

**Arms procurement: more transnational cooperation instead of offsets**

Since 2012, Switzerland has had a legally non-binding agreement with the European Defense Agency (EDA) on armaments. Under the Framework for Cooperation agreement, Switzerland can choose what information to share and in which projects to participate. This accord grants Bern access to multilateral ventures, such as in research and development. In April 2017, the Federal Council agreed to take part in the Protection of Autonomous Systems against Enemy Interference venture alongside Germany, Austria and Finland. Such collaboration could be expanded. That would make it worth examining to what extent the Swiss armed forces should take the developments of the EDA’s Capability Development Plan into consideration (foraus 2018). The armed forces could also be more closely aligned with NATO’s capability planning process.

The resulting increase in efficiency in buying weapons could also stimulate abolishing the economically debatable practice of granting offsets in arms procurement. Such tradeoff deals have little direct positive impact on security policy, but are part of Swiss industrial strategy, with market-distorting effects. In reality, Switzerland has generally benefitted from not pursuing industrial policies (Schnell and Minsch 2013).

**Cyberdefense: an opportunity for more public-private-partnerships**

Israel is a cyber role model. In cyber defense, the interaction between state, private sector, and academia provides important economic and security policy benefits (Nünlist 2018, Baezner 2019). Something similar should be encouraged in Switzerland (Kamasa 2019), given the country’s ecosystem of top-class universities, a highly innovative private sector and a federal state structure. Convergence between military and civil-
ian know-how is necessary because the classic inter-state wars with massive ground troops and heavy artillery no longer correspond to the current security risk situation (HIIK 2019, Kamasa 2019). The Swiss military could improve its militia system by further integrating and promoting civilian know-how to develop more public-private-partnerships. Swiss banks, for example, have accumulated considerable expertise in cyber defense. Switzerland could, for example, rethink its basic training for conscripts. Should cyber specialists complete the same military basic training as, say, infantrymen? The right incentives to bring private know-how into the armed forces should be set. At the same time, the economic opportunity costs to the private sector because of obligatory male military service could be reduced. Given likely synergies, military service would not automatically result in a 100 percent absence from the workplace.

**International military cooperation ensures Swiss neutrality**

Switzerland’s armed forces have never been put to a real test at home, other than fighting floods and fires, or protecting big events like the World Economic Forum. The nearest Swiss soldiers have come to the front line have been in their foreign peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. Switzerland’s credibility as an international security player could be strengthened if, on top of its multilateral and diplomatic efforts for peace, the country were also to participate more fully in military peace missions compatible with its neutrality.

As a UN or OSCE mandate is a precondition for deployment abroad, the simple legal concept of neutrality remains solid. Compared to the other neutral countries, Switzerland has been rather reluctant to deploy larger numbers of troops. Nevertheless, there is probably no better development of useful skills for Swiss soldiers than these kind of peacebuilding missions. A more robust approach might even gain greater domestic backing. The mission in Kosovo, for example, has, so far, been a success, with Switzerland’s role well-recognized by its international partners (SWISSINT 2019b). Providing more personnel in Kosovo or Bosnia would not dilute Swiss neutrality. Quite the contrary, whenever Switzerland engages with a clear profile, it is well-recognized. This was the case in the Geneva Dialogue, the UN open ended working group on disarmament, or during the Helsinki process in the Cold War era. Switzerland does not have to be afraid of punching above its weight when there is both know-how and opportunity.

**How can Switzerland expand as a hub for security and governance skills?**

Regularly hosting international conferences and institutions has made Switzerland a country where conflicts are resol-
ved – or at least paused – rather than prolonged. And Switzerland’s currency and banks often serve as safe havens during uncertainty. If data becomes the new crucial resource in the fourth industrial revolution, Switzerland can play a vital part here too.

Geneva could be a prime location for global governance institutes in cyber security, AI or hybrid threats, developing worldwide norms and standards. As with financial assets, Switzerland could also potentially form a safe harbor for big data (AVIS 2019). The country already has a good reputation and is widely recognized thanks to institutions like CERN, the Labor Spiez chemicals testing facility or its various financial institutions. This element of soft power can also guarantee security, since attacking one’s own safeguarded resources (data, wealth, knowledge) is usually unattractive. However, exceptions like the aggressive Russian espionage and disinformation regarding the Spiez facility show that being a host country also carries risks (NZZ 2019).

1.4 _Conclusion_

Being a non-aligned country in the heart of Europe has worked in Switzerland’s favor for many decades, especially during the Cold War. However, 30 years after the end of this clearly defined bipolar balance of power, new security risks have emerged. Great power competition, terrorism, cyber attacks and organized crime require more, not less, cooperation with like-minded partners.

There does not have to be a trade-off between neutrality and international cooperation. Greater engagement in international military peacebuilding missions, for example, would reinforce Swiss neutrality internationally and allow the Swiss military to gain real military experience and maintain interoperability. Switzerland should also expand its security know-how and strengthen its governance hub – a role for which Geneva is well suited. Moreover, the Federal Administration might need a reorganization to establish a new security staff unit to coordinate currently fragmented government security policies and to increase the effectiveness of international political cooperation.

However, this chapter has highlighted that even the best intentions are of little use if Switzerland does not overcome its domestic policy constraints. It must also develop a strategic vision of security policy, based on systematic security risk assessments, strategic prioritizations and cost transparency. To constructively discuss the value of autonomy, sovereignty and neutrality, the public should be thoroughly informed about what Switzerland needs to protect itself against and how.
Literature


Szvircsev Tresch, Tibor; Wenger, Andreas; De Rosa, Stefano; Ferst, Thomas; Giovanoli Mauro; Moehlecke de Baseggio, Eva; Reiss, Thomas; Rinaldo, Andrea; Schneider, Olivia und Scurrrell, Jennifer Victoria (2019): Sicherheit 2019 – Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungs-politische Meinungsbildung im Trend. Zürich und Birmensdorf: Militärakademie (MILAK) und CSS, ETH.
Sweden’s relationship with European defense cooperation has long been defined by ambiguity and complexity. But a Sweden reacting to an aggressive Russia, Brexit, Trump and an assertive China could be on its way to rebalancing its EU posture on security and defense.

Traditional Swedish scepticism towards European defense integration turns primarily on the country’s history of neutrality and non-alignment, and the fact that Sweden did not join the EU for security policy interests. However, Sweden quickly embraced both the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) when joining the EU in the 1990s and has participated in every military CSDP mission so far. Nevertheless, within the institutional development of EU’s security and defense policy, Sweden has often “remained a reluctant backseat driver” (Fägersten et al. 2018). Yet there are some signs now that Sweden will take a more active position in European defense cooperation in future.

2.1 Sweden and EU Defense Cooperation

The European Union is – as set out in the annual Swedish Foreign Policy statement – the country’s most important foreign policy arena. However, the Swedish approach to greater defense cooperation in the EU has long been lukewarm. For instance, Sweden was initially rather sceptical about the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017, mainly due to concerns about EU unity as well as the low perceived benefit to its territorial defense capabilities. Sweden decided to join the initiative after the Franco-German compromise on PESCO to be both “inclusive and exclusive.” Separately, Angela Merkel also urged Sweden to participate to signal EU unity after the Brexit vote (Fägersten et al. 2018: 4).

The goal of “European Strategic Autonomy” is, however, still highly contested in Sweden (Franke and Varma 2019). Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist has, for instance, recently stated that Sweden “opposes European Strategic Autonomy in industrial terms”, mainly due to industry’s close ties...
to British and US defense counterparts. Swedish politicians have instead emphasized the operational aspect of the concept and argued that the EU “should be able to act with its partners whenever possible, but on its own if necessary” (Wallström and Hultqvist 2019). This could indicate a more active Swedish stance in the European Union’s military realm, which has also been manifested by the Swedish Defense Commission statement that “European defense cooperation is at a formative stage [...] and that Sweden more actively needs to influence its development” (Swedish Defense Commission 2019). Nevertheless, Sweden still has some concerns about ongoing security and defense developments in the EU, especially regarding opening PESCO projects to third countries.

2.2 _ Nordic and Regional Defense Cooperation _

Sweden has in recent years greatly enhanced military cooperation with Finland, its most important defense partner. The Finnish stance on deepening EU defense cooperation, however, differs to Sweden’s, since Finland has, for example, been keener to develop the EU’s “mutual assistant clause” (Article 42.7) as well as having a more positive approach towards “European Strategic Autonomy” (Franke and Varma 2019). Even so, this has not affected far-reaching Swedish-Finnish defense cooperation, which will be further intensified in 2019–2020. The Nordic Defense Cooperation, (NORDEFCO), comprising Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland, were strengthened during 2018 with the new NORDEFCO Vision 2025. The latter states that the Nordic countries “will improve our defense capability and cooperation in peace, crisis and conflict”.

However, differences between the Nordic countries remain striking. Norway and Denmark are in NATO, while Sweden and Finland lie outside. Norway is a non-EU member, though it often contributes to military and civilian CSDP missions, while Denmark has an opt-out from CSDP. Such asymmetries constrain the possibility and scope of Nordic defense cooperation.

Sweden has furthermore decided to join most of the different multinational defense cooperation structures in Europe. In 2017, it joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which its government sees both as a way to strengthen bilateral relations with the UK and provide an important instrument for different military operations. With the probability of Brexit in the near future, it is also important for Sweden to affiliate closely with the UK in security and defense matters. Another example of Sweden’s ambition to align with the UK is the Swedish Defense Committee’s aim to include the UK in the Swedish unilateral declaration of solidarity, even after Brexit (Swedish Defense Commission 2019).
Sweden: Is a reluctant Sweden moving towards European integration in defence?
In 2018, Sweden also decided to join the German-led Framework Nation Concept (FNC). The decision was primarily seen by Sweden as a way to strengthen security policy relations with Germany (Hagström and Sjökvist 2019: 21–22).

Swedish participation in the French-led European Intervention Initiative (E2I) was initially uncertain, for two reasons in particular. First, because the Swedish Armed Forces were in a process of building up territorial defense capabilities, Swedish participation in international operations was likely to be reduced. Secondly, the Swedish government feared that intergovernmental “coalitions of the willing” initiatives outside the EU could reduce cohesion within the Union (Fägersten et al. 2018: 6–8). However, in summer 2019, the Swedish government declared its ambition to join the E2I. Sweden has also in recent years increased security and defense cooperation with France – for instance through the common Swedish-French PESCO project, as well as the new declaration on EU cooperation between Sweden and France (The Government of Sweden 2019a). In addition, since E2I should be “resource-neutral” the cost of participation would be low and thus not substantially affect Sweden’s defense budget. Sweden was thus invited to join the initiative at the E2I ministerial meeting in September 2019.

2.3 Sweden, NATO and the US

Sweden’s historical relationship with NATO is complex. However, since the country joined the PfP program in 1994, cooperation has deepened. Sweden is today one of NATO’s most active partners and has participated in several NATO-led operations. Furthermore, Sweden signed a memorandum of understanding with NATO on Host Nation Support in 2016. However, while Sweden has strengthened its relationship with NATO, the likelihood of membership in the near future remains small (Fägersten and Jerdén 2018: 347). The relationship with the US has also been reinforced, for instance through a trilateral Statement of Intent between Sweden, the USA and Finland. Sweden has also decided to procure US Patriot surface-to-air missiles to strengthen bilateral relations. Moreover, the Swedish defense group SAAB, together with Boeing, recently won a contract to develop and build the US Air Force’s new training aircraft and is thus heavily integrated into the US defense supply chain.

2.4 The Future European Security Order – Challenges ahead for Sweden

The overall trend suggests a “normalization” of Sweden’s approach to European defense cooperation. But developments both in and outside the EU pose important questions for Sweden. Given the political appe-
tite for military (and civil) EU CSDP-missions has decreased over the last decade, formats such as E2I and JEF could play a more important role in future. Hence, one important question is how Sweden will (or must) prioritize between the EU’s CSDP and participation in “coalition of willing” missions. Another significant issue will consequently be how the overall EU security and defense architecture will develop thereafter. Will there be a more fragmented union, where the EU/Europe will be a bystander in world affairs? Or will there instead in the realm of security and defense cooperation be more European “coalitions of the willing” initiatives? Or could the EU develop into a fully fledged defense union? (Fägersten and Danielsson 2018). Current trends suggest that “coalition of willing” initiatives will continue to play an important role. Sweden is in that sense well equipped thorough its participation in initiatives such as JEF, FNC and NORDEFCO.

However, developments in the EU have also been especially marked in the past couple of years, with the launch of several new initiatives. New political leadership of the Union will most likely continue this path (Tocci 2019). It is thus time for Sweden to take a more active position and engage in the more institutional debates in the Union. For instance, one area where Sweden could take a more active stance regards the development of the EU’s “mutual assistance clause” (Article 42.7). Sweden today has a far-reaching unilateral statement of solidarity, declaring that “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers [...] an attack.” Moreover, Sweden “expect[s] these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected” (The Government of Sweden 2019b). Despite this, Swedish willingness to push for reform of EU Article 42.7 has been absent.

Ultimately, Swedish willingness to strengthen the EU’s “actorness” in security and defense will depend on how the Euro-Atlantic relationship evolves and how Brexit affects Europe’s overall security architecture. In that sense, Brexit has already started to challenge and change Sweden’s traditional approach to EU security and defense cooperation. A reluctant Sweden is moving towards greater European defense integration.
Literature


3 _ UK: The United Kingdom and European Security after Brexit

By Benjamin Martill, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) is one of the major European actors in foreign, security and defense policies. The UK maintains close to full-spectrum military forces with expeditionary capabilities, a well-funded army, navy and airforce, and a (semi-independent) nuclear deterrent. It is an important diplomatic actor, with one of the most extensive diplomatic networks in the world, and an enviable list of institutional memberships, including a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This chapter offers a summary of what is at stake, beginning with a discussion of the UK’s role in the world and its engagement with EU foreign, security and defense policy initiatives, before considering what Brexit means for the UK and the EU and which factors are likely to drive the eventual outcome. The chapter concludes by reflecting on three possible scenarios for the medium-term.

3.1 _ Britain and EU Security and Defense Policies
The UK’s attitude towards EU security and defense policies has historically been lukewarm, reflecting partly its approach to European integration more generally, but also the pre-eminence with which the UK has treated the Atlantic connection (and NATO) in its foreign and security policies. During the Cold War, Britain (and France) pushed hard for an American guarantee against the perceived Soviet threat to the European continent, and succeeded in the late 1940s and early 1950s – first through informal and then formal channels – in convincing the US to agree to a mutual defense treaty. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in subsequent years represented the culmination of these efforts.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s – and the conflicts it unleashed – laid the groundwork for the emergence of a European security and defense capability and to greater efforts to coordinate foreign policy matters. European inaction in the Balkans in the mid-1990s did much to convince EU leaders in general that a more robust indigenous capability was required, and British prime minister Tony Blair in particular that this represented
the right approach to hedge against the possibility of American disengagement from Europe. Europe’s first-hand experience with the nature of the “new wars” thus contributed directly to the joint Saint Malo declaration at which British and French leaders committed themselves to establishing a joint European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Initial ESDP missions in the Balkans and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were viewed as relative successes, and led to a considerable amount of both institutional creation and policy learning by the EU and the member states (Smith 2017). To this date, however, Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP) missions remain low-risk, internationally-sanctioned, non-divisive, essentially lowest-common-denominator affairs. Divergent strategic cultures between member states, shortfalls in capabilities, and the presence of alternative bilateral and multilateral forums for deployment largely explain the failure of the CSDP to evolve much beyond its initial strictures. For its part, the UK has ceased to invest in the CSDP, and British contributions remain well below what might be expected from a large member state.

3.2 _ Brexit and European Security_

Formally, as a non-member, the UK stands to lose access to the EU’s decision-making process and membership of the key forums – the Foreign Affairs Council and the Political and Security Committee – at which agreement is reached (or not) on matters of EU foreign and security policy, respectively. Essentially, the UK loses the ability to upload its foreign policy concerns to the EU level and the multiplier effect that comes with it (Whitman 2016). The UK is keen to stay involved in EU security policies, and Theresa May’s government unveiled reasonably far-reaching proposals for consultation and collaboration, in part spurred by the belief that many member states would welcome comprehensive British proposals in this area. Yet these ideas encountered resistance from the EU on the grounds that they would undermine the decision-making autonomy of the EU, as well as on the (unstated) rationale that other non-EU member states (e.g. Turkey) might seek similar arrangements (Martill and Sus 2018).

On the face of it, the EU also loses from Brexit, since the UK is a major security and defense actor with important diplomatic and military capacities which could serve EU foreign and security policy goals, as well as specific capabilities – such as strategic airlift – in which the EU is lacking. Although it is difficult to quantify the benefits of having a nuclear power with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as a member of the Union, it is much easier to calculate the specific shortfall in the EU budget which the UK’s withdrawal precipitates. Also somewhat intangible is
the credibility associated with the UK’s engagement with EU security policy, and the potential credibility boost which such initiatives as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) could develop if the UK were to end up participating (Besch 2018).

On the other hand, the EU is not prepared to pay any price to keep the Brits on board. Brexit has become an existential crisis for the EU, and it is widely believed that any outcome favorable to Britain will lead to the unravelling of the European project. Moreover, the EU is keen to defend the integrity of its decision-making structures from the kinds of political compromises which might be necessary to keep the UK plugged in. And, of course, there are those in the EU who believe the Union’s role in the world will be strengthened by having the awkward Brits outside the tent, given their penchant for vetoing the Union’s security and defense initiatives. Indeed, since the Brexit vote in 2016, the EU has launched a number of initiatives in security and defense policy, including PESCO, the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC).

3.3 _ Key Drivers_

There are a number of factors pushing towards a close UK-EU relationship in security and defense. One is international insecurity. Russian aggression on Europe’s eastern flank, instability in the Middle East, fears of American disengagement, and an increasingly assertive China all necessitate collective efforts to confront what is seen as a more troubling strategic milieu. Another is the commonality of interests between the UK and the EU27, which are similar in a number of respects: They inhabit the same strategic milieu, share a number of common “European” goals, and are insufficiently strong to affect major international change by themselves. Finally, shrinking defense budgets create incentives for collaborative procurement and collective deployment, not least when similar hardware is desired, to fulfill reasonably similar goals.

Two factors would seem, however, to mitigate expectations of strong UK-EU relations in security and defense. The pre-eminence of NATO in defense makes Brexit less of a problem than it may be in other policy areas, since the UK is not leaving NATO, an organization of which it has been an ardent supporter over the years. The continuity of NATO thus cushions the UK’s exit from the EU. Moreover, declining British interest in the CSDP means the UK is withdrawing from an instrument it has demonstrably ceased to find much value in, and lessens incentives for seeking continued participation. For the EU, it also means that the shortfalls created by British withdrawal from the CSDP would be effectively minimized.
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Then there remain a number of important uncertainties. One is the Trump factor. On the one hand, Trump’s approach validates Brexit and holds out the prospect of at least some external assistance in managing the economic fallout for the UK. On the other hand, Trump’s lukewarm support for NATO may convince the UK that a secure future lies – at least in part – in pursuing European alternatives, and popular opposition to Trump’s often-crass statements may endear greater support for this in British public opinion. It is also unclear how the distinctive institutional set-up of the EU’s foreign and security policies will factor into the equation. The intergovernmental nature of this policy area makes British participation easier in principle, since the sovereignty cost is lower. But it also suggests some of the same functionality could be achieved by extra-EU arrangements.

3.4 Conclusion: Three Scenarios

There is, then, no clarity on the direction Brexit will take, nor which of these factors – many of which push in different directions – will dominate. Politics, interests, and institutions will all come to affect the outcome unpredictably. By way of a conclusion, this chapter offers three scenarios for the UK’s future relationship with the EU in foreign, security and defense policy.

The first, which may be termed “institutional alignment”, sees the UK continuing to participate in a number of EU foreign and security policy initiatives, including CSDP missions, PESCO, and the EDF. This would require UK commitment in demonstrating its willingness to act in cohort with the Europeans, and flexibility from the EU side, which may decide the credibility boost it receives from keeping the Brits “plugged in” outweighs the risk of moral hazard. Most likely this scenario could come about only through the agreement of a Brexit deal which keeps the UK closely aligned with the EU, and which serves to dissipate the political tensions on both sides that have emerged in recent years.

A second scenario – “European intergovernmentalism” – sees the UK continue to focus on collaboration with its European partners, but through increased bilateral ties – and through NATO – rather than through EU structures. Collaboration may take place through existing bilateral agreements – the Lancaster House treaties with France offer one such option – or through new initiatives, such as Emmanuel Macron’s European Intervention Initiative. It may also involve a return to efforts to establish a European pillar in NATO. This scenario is easier to envisage than the former, as it does not require institutional chicanery on behalf of the EU and is less politically problematic in the UK.
A final scenario may be associated with a fundamental divergence between the UK and the EU and with both sides pursuing interests and projects which put them at odds with one another. The UK, for its part, may seek to follow the “Global Britain” route by placing greater emphasis on its extra-European ties and may seek to invest more in its own initiatives, such as the UK alternative to Galileo. The EU, in turn, may try to keep the UK outside EU initiatives for fear of inviting in a “spoiler”, and may in time develop in a direction which comes to challenge NATO, rather than complement it. This scenario is perhaps the least likely in the short-term. But in the long-term greater divergence between both sides cannot be ruled out.

**Literature**


The year 2019 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the first wave of the European Union’s enlargement to include the former communist states of Central Europe, of which Poland was by far the largest and militarily most able. With a population of 38 million and consistently robust defense spending, the country has emerged as one of the potential pillars of European security and defense policy.

As the EU enlarged, it underwent a strategic change, triggered by the implications of the end of Cold War. Some 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU’s security and defense capability is still developing. But since 2016, progress has been faster, leading to the creation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund. As the EU ramps up defense policy, sometimes under the banner of strategic autonomy, Poland’s contribution can be questioned.

This paper argues that Poland’s attitude towards the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been uneven and inconsistent. It identifies three phases in the development of Poland’s position.

4.1 Poland’s Security and Defense Policy

Poland is the largest state in the former communist bloc, but only the sixth biggest in the EU. Its economy has been growing without interruption for the past 29 years, including 2008 – 2010, when the rest of the EU fell into recession. However, like others in the former Communist bloc, Poland still has a lot of catching up to do, with its economy accounting for just 2.9 percent of the entire aggregate EU GDP in 2018 (Bayer 2018).
While the most capable in the region, Poland’s military has been classified by the fire-power index as twenty-fourth globally in 2018 – down from seventeenth the previous year (Globalfirepower.com 2019). Poland and Estonia have been the most consistent defense spenders in the region. Since the late 1990s Poland legally mandated spending at not lower than 1.8 percent of GDP. Since Poland’s GDP has grown uninterruptedly since the early 1990s, defense spending has followed suit, at least in real terms. In 2018, military spending was raised to 2 percent of GDP, reaching nearly $12 billion and making Poland the world’s nineteenth biggest spender (Defence 2.4 2019).

**East Flank Nation**

The five nations spending most on defense in central Europe, comprising the three Baltic States, Poland and Romania, also represent NATO’s eastern flank. Romania excepted, they directly border Russia and consider themselves to be most exposed to the Russian threat. All five nations (plus Bulgaria) are currently hosting NATO or US military presences. The three Baltic States and Poland host multinational NATO battlegroups in the framework of Enhanced Forward Presence, as agreed at the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016. The US in Poland; Canada in Latvia; the UK in Estonia; and Germany in Lithuania lead the groups, which together account for 4,500 – 5,000 troops. The groups include contributions from other central European nations, such as Czech, Polish, Slovak and Slovene units in Adazi in Latvia, Czech units in Rukla in Lithuania and Romanians and Croats in Orzysz in Poland (NATO 2018).

Poland, Romania and Bulgaria also host the American military following the completion of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), which the US signed with Romania and Bulgaria in 2005 and 2006, and with Poland in 2009. Within the framework of the European Deterrence Initiative, initiated by President Obama and boosted by President Trump, Poland is home to the US Armoured Brigade in Zagań in the west of the country. The brigade has boosted the US presence in Poland to 4,500 troops – all, however, stationed on a rotational basis (US Mission Poland 2017). Poland is trying to change this and ensure a permanent American presence by offering to cover all logistical costs. In June 2019, during President Andrzej Duda’s visit to the White House, President Trump announced the US troop presence would be boosted by an additional 1,000 soldiers (he even mentioned 2,000, but official communications stick to the lower number) and the fact that Poland would cover the entire cost of this operation.

Poland’s strong Atlanticism is also demonstrated in procurement policy. After 2000, the country was the first former communist nation to purchase a large number
(48) of US-made F-16 fighter jets. Recently, Warsaw announced it was in talks with US defense manufacturer Lockheed-Martin to complete a $6.5 billion contract for latest generation F-35 aircraft. Poland has also signed a deal to build domestic missile and air defense systems (outside the context of US missile defense installations) with Raytheon, maker of Patriot missiles. The value of this contract is $4.75 billion, with delivery due in 2022 (Reuters 2018).

4.2 Poland’s Perspectives on EU Defense

On joining the EU, most central European states, Poland included, did not pay much attention to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) – renamed the CSDP following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

Poles tended to see their NATO and EU membership as parts of one process – often referred to as Euro-Atlantic integration – in which each organization was assigned different roles. NATO was perceived as addressing Poland’s security vulnerabilities, while the EU was viewed as providing modernizing and economic opportunities to catch up with the west.

The first wave of EU enlargement in 2004 coincided with a major crisis in transatlantic relations over the Iraq war. Poland, along with other central European states (with the exception of Slovenia), supported the US and was genuinely surprised to be criticized for this by the majority of the EU (Sedivy and Zaborowski 2005). Consequently, Poles and other central Europeans learnt the hard way that western allies may be divided, and that there was a drive towards strategic autonomy for the EU in response to the transatlantic crisis.

However, in subsequent years, the idea of EU defense policy did not really take off while the EU become embroiled in its own internal crisis over the failed Constitutional Treaty (2005), followed by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and finally the economic and single currency crises (2009 – 2013). In this period most central Europeans did not really pay much attention to the idea of EU defense. A notable exception was Poland, which, under its former pro-European government (2007 – 2015), teamed up with France and Germany jointly to propose measures to boost CSDP, including setting up independent headquarters for planning EU operations. Warsaw emerged as the keenest supporter of EU defense integration, being in fact more ambitious on the matter than Berlin or Paris – both of which lacked the same focus (Zaborowski 2018). France, for example, chose to prioritize the development of its bilateral security agreement with the UK (Lancaster Agreement) over the broader European dimension.

The EU’s interest in defense integration started to re-emerge after Donald Trump’s election in 2016. Trump openly questioned
the value of NATO, which he called an “obsolete alliance” and on several occasions put into doubt the application of the Alliance’s Article 5, which stipulates collective defense (New York Times 2017). The loss of confidence in the automaticity of the US security guarantees prompted a move back towards European defense integration and a renewed call for the strategic autonomy of the EU (Kempin and Kunz 2017).

As opposed to former, mostly declaratory, moves on the matter, the EU this time established some concrete initiatives that are indeed promoting defense integration. Most importantly, in 2018, it launched PESCO, allowing a selected group of states to participate in specialized defense projects. All the central European nations were amongst the 25 member states opting to join, Poland included. However, since the change of government in autumn 2015, Poland’s attitude towards CSDP has substantially cooled, as reflected in Warsaw’s lukewarm attitude towards PESCO and the decision to join a minimal number (just two) projects.

Poland also opted to join PESCO at the last possible moment and with reservations underlined in its letter of accession. After the announcement of its decision to join the enhanced co-operation mechanism, Poland’s foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski openly declared Warsaw did so unwillingly, and that it was opposed to the evolution of any defense integration that could rival NATO and endanger relations with the US. Waszczykowski also expressed concern about privileging large European (meaning Franco-German) defense companies, which, in his view, could lead to the exclusion of smaller central European counterparts, as well as discriminating against US manufacturers. Warsaw also underlined that it opposed the idea of European Defense Union (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017).

However, over time Poland’s conservative government became somewhat less sceptical towards PESCO and opted to boost participation in the second batch of PESCO projects, announced in November 2018. Poland is now a member or an observer in 10 out of 17 projects (Defence 24, 2018).

It also became apparent that PESCO has not turned into a mechanism of exclusion. The scheme, designed as a means to promote deeper integration amongst a selected number of states, was actually joined by almost all EU nations. Only the UK, Denmark and Malta opted out. This prompted France to create a more exclusive format – the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) – outside the institutional frameworks of both NATO and the EU (ECFR 2018). The E2I is meant to be focused on capabilities, and to promote a shared strategic culture – meaning an ability and willingness to co-operate on operations. With membership restricted to just 10 states, the E2I has the benefit of including
the UK and Denmark. However, at the same time, there is no doubt the initiative also plays a political role, which is largely discriminatory towards central European states. Estonia was the only regional representative invited to join. Poland was not invited, even though it had the most developed capabilities in the region.

4.3 Three Stages in Forming Central European Perspectives on CSDP

Some 15 years into the first wave of EU enlargement, Poland’s position on EU defense ambitions is still clarifying and, as shown above, is still subject to frequent fluctuations, guided mostly by internal politics. Overall, there have been three stages in the evolution of Poland’s position.

In the first, between 1992–2004, Poles perceived security issues exclusively in the NATO context and paid little attention to the EU’s defense ambitions. This was the time of unrivalled US strategic superiority, coupled (for most of the period), with Russia’s rapid decline. Emerging out of communism, Poland chose the Atlanticist option, pulling out of the Warsaw Pact and demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. Warsaw also applied for NATO membership, joining in 1999 and immediately supporting Alliance operations in Kosovo. Soon after, Warsaw also supported the Iraq war, unlike most other Europeans.

The idea of boosting EU defense capacities independently of NATO, as pronounced by the leaders of France, Germany and Belgium at the 2003 Tervuren summit, was strongly criticized by the Polish government (The Guardian 2003). Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz expressed unease about the summit’s conclusions, stating that, while Warsaw supported the development of an EU defense arm, this should be in the NATO context. In particular, Cimoszewicz expressed concern about the proposed format of “structured co-operation”, meaning the creation of an exclusive group of likeminded states closed to other EU members. Poland was also concerned about setting up a headquarters for planning EU operations – supposedly in Tervuren – and objected to introducing security guarantees among EU member states, which would be separate from NATO. Overall, as a new member of NATO Poland was deeply uneasy about any EU initiative that could duplicate the role of the Alliance (Gazeta Wyborcza 2003).

Among the main reasons for Warsaw’s desire to protect NATO’s priority over the EU was its status in both organizations: the country had joined NATO in 1999, whereas EU membership came only in May 2004 after seven years of painful and often humiliating negotiations.

During the second period, from 2005–2015, CSDP was in stagnation, with the EU focused on constitutional and eco-
nomic crises. Security matters became a matter of secondary importance and investment in defense was declining across the EU. However, during this period Warsaw emerged as one of the strongest supporters of CSDP, teaming up with Berlin and Paris (Zaborowski 2018).

The third period started with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, with Europeans obliged to re-evaluate their reliance on US security guarantees. They were also under US pressure to increase defense expenditure. The EU reacted by launching initiatives, such as PESCO and the European Defense Fund, aimed at strengthening defense integration. All the central European nations have opted to join these mechanisms, including Poland (under the Eurosceptic government that took power in autumn 2015). After some initial reticence, the government also invested in PESCO. However, Warsaw continues to stress that PESCO be complementary to NATO obligations.

4.4 _Conclusion_

Poland is one of the few NATO nations to have increased defense spending steadily since the mid-1990s. Its armed forces have participated in NATO combat missions more often than most, having deployed some of the largest national contingents in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a consequence, Poland is one of NATO’s only net security providers. However, Poland’s reluctance to engage in European defense cooperation hampers its potential to emerge as a significant force in this field. Political and personal considerations largely drive the current Polish leadership’s scepticism towards EU attempts to develop genuine defense cooperation. After months of dithering and criticizing the launch of PESCO, Warsaw became one of the last member states to signal its intention to join. It did so with evident lack of enthusiasm, although, in subsequent years those initial doubts were somehow eased. Still, Poland’s current attitude towards CSDP is in stark contrast to that of its 2008–2015 government, which was among the avant-garde on European defense.

The PiS government’s current position is an unnecessary irritant for the rest of the EU, compounding its other big reputational problems among member states. Much of the EU perceives the Polish government as needy, demanding and lacking in solidarity, as well as often indifferent to the rule of law. Defense is one area where the government could offset some of these misgivings by demonstrating commitment to one of the EU’s signature initiatives. This could be done without large-scale investment and merely via a change of attitude.
**Literature**


Greece stands geostrategically at the crossroads of Europe, Africa and Asia – in a region still ridden with conflict and volatility threatening European security. Forming the Union’s eastern border, Greece has long felt obliged to protect both its national and the EU’s frontiers. Whenever the country has found its borders coming under pressure from transnational threats – for instance uncontrolled influxes of migrants and refugees – it has been quick to remind the European community that such incidents are not only a national problem but also a European one.

On that basis, Greece has long aimed to become a consistent contributor and integral part of the European security system in military and soft-security terms. The country’s military facilities at Souda Bay in Crete allow Athens and its allies to sustain operations in the Middle East and North Africa. Greece’s Mediterranean and Aegean coastlines also make it an indispensable actor in fighting regional challenges, like smuggling and maritime insecurity. For Greece, future European security and defense rest on a militarily capable and willing Europe, its national armed forces and on NATO.

5.1 Towards Becoming a European Global Actor

Although there is currently limited debate in Greek political and military circles about Europe’s ability to fulfil its Level of Ambition, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and strategic autonomy, the country aims for a militarily strong Union. The motivation is twofold. A stronger European defense actor could offer Greece additional protection from external threats. And there has been genuine support for European defense also integration. Although some voices argue soft power will remain Europe’s central foreign policy tool, they also recognize a stronger military capability as a valuable complement.

Traditionally, Greece has been active in European security and defense. With regards to the enhancement of the continent’s military capabilities, Greece is among the very few countries that consistently spend more than 2 percent of GDP
on defense (IISS 2019), as agreed at the Wales Summit in 2014 (NATO 2014).

Despite the fiscal challenges it has faced since 2008, Greek defense spending has not fallen below the voluntary benchmark. Nevertheless, it has been reduced by 40 percent in absolute terms (Dokos and Iliades 2019). The trend of decline may persist. But the country is expected to maintain its defense expenditure above or at 2 percent.

What is more important is that Greece fails to reach the desired 20 percent spending on acquisitions, which is a more relevant benchmark in measuring capabilities. Until recently, most of the country’s major military recapitalization and modernization plans were frozen and long overdue, because of fiscal challenges. Athens currently spends around 67 percent of its defense budget on personnel and has one of the highest per capita ratios of citizens in uniform.

Nevertheless, Greece is, and will continue to be, a major part of the European security architecture. It has among the alliance’s largest tank and fighter aircraft contingents, while its airforce and navy are reported to be on high readiness.

Greece’s contributions and importance in European security and defense is also reflected in the fact that its military headquarters in Larissa are available for the conduct of autonomous EU military operations. The Larissa HQ is, moreover, one of the five candidate European Operational Headquarters (OHQs), which may be activated to support CSDP operations/missions when required. Greece also contributes to the operational aspects of CSDP in the maritime sector, with the Multinational Sea Lift Coordination Center at Piraeus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). The latter is at the disposal of the EU and its member states following the conclusion of the necessary agreements.

Since 2007 Greece has also been leading, as a Framework Nation, an EU battlegroup (HELROC Battlegroup) with the participation of Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Serbia (HNDGS 2014). To date, the battlegroup has not been activated, as with all the other European battlegroups. But this is not to imply, however, they may not well be activated in future. Leading the battlegroup testifies to Athens’ regional military superiority and explicitly demonstrates the country’s role in European security architecture.

Greece is, furthermore, one the most active countries in the Union’s latest security and defense initiative, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) |3. Driven by the conviction that PESCO is the first step to a more capable Europe and a

3 PESCO is a treaty based framework that enables capable and willing states to deepen defense cooperation, collaboratively develop defense capabilities and create synergies in the field of defense.
common defense policy, Athens has made a conscious decision to be at the forefront (Efstathiou 2018). It has adopted 14 of 34 projects and is leading five of them. Although PESCO’s net contribution in European security and defense is not yet clear, Greece has been one of the very few countries to have made progress with the projects it leads, having also identified the resources required (Efstathiou et al. 2019).

But to achieve a stronger Union, all members should be aware and have a strategy to deal with present, emerging and future threats. Athens has devoted little attention to cyber and hybrid warfare, concepts that already shape the European security environment and will become even more relevant in future. Despite the fact that Greece has been hosting the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) since 2004, and would thus be expected to be well-versed on cyber threats, the country adopted a national cyber defense strategy only in 2018 (Ministry Of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information 2018). With regards to hybrid warfare, Athens became a member of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in April 2019 (Hybrid CoE 2019).

Considering the country’s geostrategic location and demographics (4), investing and cooperating with other European and allied states on countering hybrid threats should be an area of increased interest.

But domestic discussions are currently focused mostly on national security challenges and conventional arms, due to the perceived fear of attack by Turkey. Indeed, given the limited financial resources and the regional security environment, Athens is mostly preoccupied with recapitalizing and modernizing its military to face a conventional threat from Ankara.

5.2 European Security and International Cooperation

Greece is clearly investing in Europe’s ability to provide its own security. But the country has also been careful to note EU initiatives should not replace NATO, but complement it. Athens firmly sees the transatlantic alliance as the backbone of European defense, however, it remains an exception in NATO in being the only country in the alliance to perceive a threat from a fellow member.

Allies have argued that Turkey is a destabilizer in NATO and the EU due to its decision to buy the Russian S-400 air-defense system and use migrants and refugees as a political instrument. But for Athens, it is also a national threat, which it will have to face alone. There is a perception among the Greek public and military

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4 Minorities in Greece are small in size compared to Balkan regional standards. Most of the minorities are concentrated in Thrace, Northern Greece.
Greece: Greece and European security; an amalgam of complementary actors
that the country would have to fight alone if challenged by Ankara. Although its latest White Paper published in 2014 does not directly mention Turkey as a security threat – for the sake of political correctness – Athens has long argued Ankara violates its airspace and maritime borders. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated in recent years following gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean and disputes over the Aegean Sea’s status quo. Thus, for Greece the future European security architecture is also affected by Ankara’s increasingly assertive foreign policy and drift away from the West.

Finally, when it comes to bilateral or multilateral defense projects, Athens is increasingly investing in bilateral and multilateral relations with regional players and beyond. The country currently has bilateral defense cooperation accords with Bulgaria, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. With the latter three in particular, it is collaborating in maritime security, protection of energy facilities and cooperation between intelligence agencies to fight terrorism. Greece also has bilateral relations with the US, based on the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), which provides for a naval support facility and an airfield at Souda Bay, the airbases of Stefanovikeio and Larissa in central Greece and the port of Alexandroupoli.

Stemming from the conviction that the future of European security is integrally linked to the US, Athens has been keen to promote the bilateral relationship. The past couple of years in particular have seen increased military to military contact, the initiation of a strategic dialogue and the renewal of the MDCA (U.S. Department of State 2011). The US Ambassador to Athens has underlined that such increasingly warm relations are not born out of opportunity, but choice, and that they are mutually exclusive from Washington’s relationship with Ankara. Yet unless Turkey returns to the West and its European path, Greece is expected to assume an even greater role in European security affairs in future.

5.3 Conclusion

For Greece, European security is and will continue to be part of a larger equation. Athens considers NATO to be the prime pillar guaranteeing European security and the most effective deterrent from external threats.

Should Ankara continue its current trajectory, Greece’s geostrategic importance in the alliance is expected to rise further. But according to Athens, the EU also has a role to play, complementing, rather than replacing NATO efforts. Initiatives like PESCO, if successful, will make Europeans more useful to their ally across the Atlantic and allow them to provide better security. Nevertheless, given its geographical location and its perceived security environ-
ment, Athens is also investing in its national military and defense cooperation with regional players sharing similar interests and challenges. This amalgam of security providers is believed to secure the state and the Union’s south-eastern flank. Yet to reach an effective security and defense policy that corresponds to present, emerging and future threats, Athens needs continue engaging more actively in international debate.

**Literature**


This paper analyzes Italy’s role in European and transatlantic security architecture. It describes the country’s foreign policy characteristics and priorities in security cooperation and analyses briefly whether recent political shifts have influenced the country’s international positioning. Finally, it reflects on how Italy could contribute to European security cooperation by relying on its “middle power” characteristics, based on its strategic position in the central Mediterranean, solid contribution to NATO, good relations with Russia and support for European defense cooperation initiatives.

6.1 Italy in the European and Transatlantic Security Architecture

Since the end of World War II, Italian domestic politics have stood out for their chronic instability, resulting in constant shifts of government. The most recent significant change occurred with a reshuffling of the ruling parties from the so-called giallo-verde (yellow-green) to the giallo-rosso (yellow-red) coalition. That took Italy to its 63rd government in 70 years, in fact most postwar executives have lasted less than a year (Italian Senate 2019).

Voters’ pro-European feelings have in recent years given way to growing discontent with Brussels-based EU institutions, widely considered to be largely responsible for the 2008 economic crisis and the austerity policies adopted thereafter. Such discontent culminated in the June 2018 election of the most Eurosceptic postwar governing coalition, comprising the anti-migrant, nationalist League, led by former Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, and the unpredictable Five Star Movement, which took power for the first time. The latter’s leader Beppe Grillo promised voters a referendum on Italy’s participation in the Euro, leading to “Italexit” emerging as a remote, but not impossible, outcome.

Although Italy seems structurally unable to elect lasting governments, foreign and security policy has been largely unaffected, at least regarding the two basic pillars defining its security alliances on the international scene, namely membership of NATO and the European Union.
Italy is among the founders of both of these considerably different cooperative security frameworks and has a marked preference for consensus-building in multilateral forums rather than for unilateralism, which is typical of Rome’s approach on the international arena and best serves its interests.

But the formation of the populist, eurosceptic League-Five Star coalition damaged the country’s alliances and consensus building ability at European and international level. This resulted in the new government’s preference for a nationalist and unilateral approach, and reliance on personal relations of the League’s leader, coupled with the lack of experience of the Five Star Movement representatives. Surprisingly enough, the government did not reverse Italy’s foreign and defense policy, which remained anchored to Italy’s traditional role as a NATO ally and EU member. Nevertheless, the brief Conte I government saw Italy isolating itself in European politics (Bonvicini 2019) and provoked unprecedented diplomatic tensions with historical allies (Figá-Talamanca 2019).

Internationally, Italy’s strategy, actions and policies are characterized by strong adherence to multilateralism and international cooperation. Practically, this translates into active participation in relevant security frameworks, international institutions and organizations, such as the EU, NATO, the UN, OSCE, OECD, and the Council of Europe. Italy also participates in less institutionalized forums, such as the G7, G8, and G20. In terms of foreign and security policy, Rome is often labeled a “middle power”, able to achieve its goals more easily through multilateralism and cooperation with both “great powers” and other countries. Priorities include tackling instability in North Africa and the Middle East – notably Libya – managing migration flows, and guaranteeing energy supplies.

Italy is strongly rooted in European and transatlantic security frameworks. It is one of the EU’s founders and – until recently – was enthusiastic about further integration. Likewise membership of NATO has been largely supported by ruling parties and coalitions in the 70 years since the alliance’s creation, leading to a “bipartisan” adherence to NATO principles and goals. Italy is an active participant in alliance missions and operations abroad. It also contributes to the collective defense of eastern European allies by forming part of the Enhanced Forward Presence initiative in Latvia, with armored vehicles and 166 personnel (Leuprecht et al. 2019).

Geographically, Italy shares borders with two countries that are not entirely part of the same security architecture. These are Austria, which is an EU but not a NATO member, and Switzerland, which is not part of the EU or NATO. Italy and Switzerland have strong ties and cooperate closely on transport, finance, taxation
and energy. Both participate to the Gar Si Sahel project in the Sahel region, where Italian Carabinieri are currently involved in training and mentoring Malian security forces. Further collaboration with Switzerland could stem from cross border security efforts or equipment interoperability, allowing better participation in joint peacekeeping operations. The possibility of third countries joining the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative could also be an opportunity for greater Italo-Swiss security collaboration.

6.2 Cooperative Security: at Least Three Areas Where Italy Could Contribute

**Italy – a “hub” for the stabilization in the Mediterranean region**

Italy plays a role of a “hub” at the crossroads of EU, Balkans, North Africa and Middle East. Instability in the EU Southern Neighborhood resulted in spreading organized crime, radicalization, arms and drugs trafficking, and massive migration flows, all factors potentially affecing security in the broader Mediterranean, including Italy. Tackling regional instability, resolving conflicts and improving security and living standards is a geopolitical priority for Rome, which should lead the relaunch of the stabilization process, especially in Libya, with which Italy has historic ties. The extended experience in training and mentoring, security forces assistance, and crisis management operations (notably in non-combat activities) of Italy’s armed forces is internationally acknowledged. Coupled with skilled political and diplomatic leadership, it could be a tool to improve trust-building and stability in complex and unstable environments. This could be suitable for bilateral as well as multilateral cooperative formats, or through participation in EU and UN missions in the region, and potentially in partnership with the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples.

**Italy – a potential mediator between NATO and Russia.**

Since the end of the Cold War, Italy belonged to the group of NATO allies favoring less confrontational and more moderate approaches towards Russia. Going back to former premier Silvio Berlusconi’s warm relations with Russian president Vladimir Putin, Moscow has long been a partner for Rome.

Nevertheless, close relations have not prevented Rome voting for renewed sanctions against Moscow after the Ukraine crisis. Italy also participates in NATO deterrence on the northeastern flank by contributing 166 military personnel and armored fighting vehicles to the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Latvia (Leuprecht et al. 2019).
Italy’s approach exemplifies a two-fold strategy towards Russia: credible deterrence and pro-active dialogue. Dialogue can prepare the ground for better mutual understanding through formal, institutional and informal channels. Countries adopting such an approach – and perceived as such by Moscow – are best positioned to intervene between Russia and NATO, avoiding the zero-sum game played by more hawkish allies. Rapprochement is possible without jeopardizing European values and liberal-democratic dynamics.

**Enhancing European defense cooperation and integration through PESCO and EDF.**

In 2016, new European defense initiatives were launched in the form of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO. These aimed at enhancing defense cooperation and integration in Europe. Italy was a strong supporter from the start, participating (as partner or observer) in 21 out of 34 PESCO projects.

Italian public opinion, including League and Five Star voters, appears strongly behind defense and international security cooperation, despite the nationalistic and anti-establishment rhetoric of both parties (Isernia et al. 2019). The unprecedented possibility of receiving funding from the European Commission for developing common defense capabilities, coupled with public support, should encourage Italian decision makers to push for greater defense cooperation and integration with European partners. This momentum could bring a qualitative leap in security and defense cooperation in Europe.
Literature


Germany’s global role has moved increasingly into the spotlight: Rising pressure from the US on Germany and other European allies to take more responsibility internationally, the increasing assertiveness of Russia in Eastern Europe, and the growing bipolarity between China and the US have dramatically changed the security environment for Germany. At the same time, given the partial retreat of the US from international forums and multilateral institutions, expectations about Germany’s international role and leadership have climbed substantially (Masala 2019).

From about 2014–15, Germany started to react: The political discourse has gradually changed, emphasizing the country’s responsibility as a key defender of the multilateral world order. In line with Emmanuel Macron’s discourse on European sovereignty, the goal to achieve “European Strategic Autonomy” has been discussed ever more often in Berlin and Brussels. While this term has been criticized for raising unrealistic expectations, it is clear that the changing global environment will require the EU and Germany to boost their investment in security, their unity and their capability for strategic thinking. This has become even more urgent with Brexit, which is – both in global diplomacy as well as in a military sense – a serious setback for the EU’s international role. Even with higher defense spending and a stronger strategic narrative, Germany alone will neither be able to “save the West” nor compensate for US disengagement. Should Berlin demonstrate a readiness to leave its “comfort zone” in certain areas of foreign and security policy, it could however help to increase Europe’s ability to be a key pillar of the multilateral world order and avoid becoming a pawn in bigger players’ game.

7.1 _ Increasing Financial and Diplomatic Resources in Foreign and Security Policy

Although some members of the public and some politicians still seem in denial, Germany will have to raise its financial and diplomatic resources in foreign and security policy substantially – both in the national and the European context – to main-
tain a key role. A defense budget rising towards NATO’s 2 percent goal should be crucial to respect commitments made in the transatlantic alliance and out of sheer self-interest. Germany, together with its European allies (be it in an EU or a NATO context) will need the capabilities to sustain both long-term and rapid-reaction missions in its wider neighborhood – even without US support. Globally, both the EU and Germany will only be taken seriously if they manage to make a difference in their own backyard. Germany should also stick to its commitments to build trust and demonstrate that it is indeed a reliable ally in times of need. Its increased engagement in recent years in the NATO framework and its presence with boots on the ground in the Baltic states are important steps in this direction. That does not mean abandoning the so-called comprehensive approach: German engagement will remain vital in other policy areas essential to conflict prevention or stabilization, such as migration, security sector reform or global health. But Germany should not hide behind the comprehensive approach to avoid stronger engagement in military security.

At the same time, it will be essential to lobby for greater public awareness of why active foreign and security policies are consistent with national values and national interest. So far, despite slight changes, the public remains somewhat reluctant about more robust engagements, especially if a military component is involved. The “debate” on possible German participation in a maritime mission in the Hormuz Strait is a recent example. Germany as a merely civilian power would, however, not be able to make its voice heard, given that most other global actors live in a world in which the ability to provide and project “hard security” remains a key component of international reputation.

7.2 _ Acting in a European Context

Given the challenges mentioned, a realistic assessment of Berlin’s current military, diplomatic, financial and political resources must lead to the conclusion that, while Germany is indeed a key actor, it can only have real global impact if its foreign and security policies are closely coordinated with its EU and European partners.

In an EU context, Germany’s objective should be twofold: to increase the EU’s capability to act, while maintaining European cohesion in foreign, security and defense policy. In this context, Germany should continue to increase its engagement in the inclusive instrument of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

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4 This could be seen i.a. in a recent Yougov poll (YouGov.de 2019) when interviewees were asked whether their country should demonstrate solidarity to other countries if they were attacked by Russia.
But it should equally play an active role in the context of Emmanuel Macron’s intervention initiative, in which only a selected number of countries participate. Germany’s responsibility is to maintain the balance between various actors and their (sometimes diverging) goals. Engagement in the context of the intervention initiative demonstrates a willingness towards France to truly move the EU’s defense readiness to a different level.

On the other hand, the commitment to pursue (more ambitious) projects in the PESCO framework is important to sustain a more institutionalized platform, including almost all EU member states, and thus prevent mistrust – particularly among those members which are (still) uneasy about France’s vision for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Moreover, Germany will need to get out of its comfort zone and renounce some of its national particularities if it wants to contribute to a credible European defense policy: This will require common European arms export guidelines (at least among the bigger member states). Germany would have to ease its own quite restrictive guidelines, a frequent cause of frustration among European allies. Such reform is essential for a joint European acquisition and capability development policy. A tentative Franco-German understanding here would be a first important step. The same would apply to a «Buy European» rule for procurement and capabilities. It would also open the door to less disjointed national defense planning and a more coordinated European industrial policy.

Finally, Germany should strive for institutional changes. These could include promoting a European Security Council (ESC) to enhance strategy-building towards strategic partners of the EU as well as regional and global actors like the US, China, Brazil, India and Russia (Wientzek and Rieck 2018; Nováky 2019). Too often, one or two member states block the EU from taking a unified decision. Such changes would help to coordinate the EU’s position both in the United Nations in general and in the Security Council in particular. A European Security Council consisting of 6 – 8 (rotating) members could act more quickly and would not have to await approval from every member state. A member state could nevertheless opt out of a specific decision if it saw key interests at stake. But it could no longer block the EU as a whole. Overall the ESC could be an alternative, or an intermediate step, to majority decision making in EU foreign and security policy.

Furthermore, Germany should push for a European white book of security and defense defining common interests, determining a defense strategy and identifying necessary capabilities.
Germany: Germany will need to leave its comfort zone.
7.3 Finding Strategic Allies beyond Europe

As has often been argued, the quest for strategic autonomy should not be confused with the unachievable (and undesirable) goal of strategic autarchy. The EU alone will need allies with shared values and interests on a diplomatic and at a military level. NATO and the transatlantic alliance will remain indispensable. In this framework, Germany should work to enhance the EU’s ties with key foreign and security policy allies by:

01 Keeping the UK close: It is of utmost importance to continue a security partnership with the UK after Brexit. This could be either via the intervention initiative, by granting access to projects funded by the European Defence Fund or by inclusion in a future European Security Council.

02 Keeping like-minded allies closer: Germany should boost diplomatic cooperation with like-minded countries in NATO and beyond, i.e. Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. A “multilateralist alliance” uniting an increasing number of countries is desirable, but will have to be deepened individually with each ally (Auswärtiges Amt 2019). If greater military cooperation with certain non-NATO countries posed problems, cooperation in civilian missions (conflict prevention as well as post-conflict stabilization) and other instruments, such as sanctions policies, should be reinforced.

03 Linking with certain key countries in Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa that broadly share similar values, even though both sides may be at odds on specific issues, such as trade or the environment. As Germany’s and Europe’s relative weight in the world is likely to continue falling, alliances will have to be enhanced with actors beyond the above-mentioned circle of “usual suspects.” That will be essential if not just any multilateral world order, but one based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, is to be preserved.
Literature


This contribution addresses burden sharing between NATO allies and aims to attenuate the debate about the 2 percent rule. The authors believe recent political rhetoric about the latter has become too emotional, deviating from the essential goal of increasing Germany’s readiness as the US’s most important ally. Just increasing the defense budget does not lead to the intended objective. Instead, the funds should be used for necessary training and infrastructure. That would help to reduce some tensions, enabling the European states, particularly Germany, to build on their long-standing strong relationship with the US, reduce friction and ensure NATO remains the most successful alliance in history. Germany stands as a model for all European countries to preserve the transatlantic relationship and assume their share of the burden.

8.1 _ The European Union and NATO

The debate about burden sharing is preceded by a long history of European-American relations, leading to the creation of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The relationship between the EU and NATO can be described as “complicated.” Both have been substantially involved in the shaping of Europe in its present form. Under the US lead, NATO was created in 1949 as an alliance against potential Russian aggression when Europe became the epicenter of this Cold War. Through Article 5 of the Pact, all allies guaranteed to assist each other in case of an attack against one of them. This guarantee was unconditionally valid until very recently and had been the foundation of Europe’s security for almost seven decades. The US has always urged Europeans to maintain and develop their own capabilities, and, when NATO’s eastern enlargement took place, such demands were institutionalized via clear rules. This demand is reflected in the now notorious requirement to spend at least 2% of a member state’s GDP on defense.

While the EU – at that time the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community – was created to avoid another war between European states through close economic
ties, it developed into a strong economic community without independent military capabilities. Europeans have therefore always had to rely on US security guarantees. Europe itself has struggled to build its own security infrastructure and in recent years has focused more on economic and social integration than security and defense. A first attempt to integrate European defense failed at the beginning of the 1950s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU developed a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although adapted and strengthened, it has not yet managed to make Europe autonomous in terms of security policy. On the other hand, the EU is criticized for building competing structures to NATO which potentially jeopardize the stability of the entire alliance.

8.2 The Two Percent Rule as Gold Standard?
At present, 21 of 29 NATO members do not fulfill the non-binding commitment to spend an agreed 2 percent of GDP on defense, though spending is projected to improve significantly over the next five years (NATO 2019: 3). Discussion has revolved around several points, particularly the need for members to: increase defense budgets and invest at least 20 percent in purchasing new materials and finance research and development programs. These guidelines emerged in the 2000s as a benchmark for the accession of, and potential guidance for new NATO members. That was reconfirmed at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea – the first time in decades military force was used by one nation to change the sovereign borders of a European country.

Every US President since Harry Truman has criticized Washington’s allies for not doing more on defense. Even Barack Obama, much admired in Europe, referred to some as “Free Riders.” But the tone has become particularly harsh under the current administration. President Trump believes the US has for too long carried an unfair burden for the collective defense of NATO members.

8.3 Changing the Narrative: An Ineffective 2 Percent Discussion
There are now divergent opinions about the logic behind the 2 percent rule. While a prevailing current, driven by the US, persists in insisting on compliance, others try to put matters in a broader context, which might also involve an eventual change of Germany’s strategic culture. That will not happen overnight, which is why this debate needs to be reconsidered (Lawrence and White 2018).

NATO members must move beyond emotional discussion and instead focus on strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of the alliance. It may initially appear logical to use the defense budget and indi-
directly, the number resulting from 2 percent of a member state’s GDP, to indicate defense efforts. However, emphasis on a fixed percentage is inadequate and counterproductive due to the continuous pressure on NATO members to meet such requirements.

While many now accept the 2 percent metric may not necessarily be the best indicator of capabilities and effectiveness of NATO forces, that is irrelevant in political and strategic terms. Every NATO member, Germany included, agreed to the metric at the Wales summit. Germany implicitly has a primary responsibility to follow this rule: as the largest economic power in Europe and with a claim to international leadership, Europeans look to Berlin. Chancellor Merkel, former defense minister von der Leyen, and her successor Kramp-Karrenbauer, have all publicly reaffirmed the spending goal, so it must be addressed. Arguing about its worthiness as a meaningful metric only damages the

* Defense Expenditure does not include pensions
** These Allies have national laws and political agreements which call for 2% of GDP to be spent on defense annually, consequently estimates are expected to change accordingly. For the past years, Allies’ defense spending was based on the then available GDP data and Allies may, therefore, have met the 2% guidelines when using those figures (In 2018 Lithuania met 2% using November 2018 OECD figures).

cohesion of the alliance. Indeed, there is value in having a key and relatively simple metric in the public debate. While many nations have not yet reached 2 percent, there are still five years to the agreed target date of 2024. Nearly every nation has arrested the decline in their spending and is now increasing expenditure. Over half NATO members are expected to achieve the target on time.

NATO has already developed a specific mechanism to measure applied capabilities, known as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). This four-year cyclic process begins with the so-called “Political Guidance for Defense”, a guideline to which allied defense ministers must agree. NATO military personnel identify the need to conduct two large and six smaller operations. NATO’s defense planners then determine specific requirements for member states. Clearly defining and monitoring capability targets allows each participating state to understand the criteria (Lunn and Williams 2017).

Nevertheless, pressure from the current US administration and NATO leadership regarding the 2 percent rule is unlikely to abate. Constructive solutions are required, including a more sophisticated approach to what the 2 percent and burden-sharing debates really mean.

8.4 The United States and NATO Need Germany More Than Ever

Germany is one of America’s closest and strongest allies. The relationship has grown historically and emerged at the end of World War II, when the US became Germany’s protective power until the end of the Cold War (U.S. State Department 2019). But already under the Obama Administration, Europe was being required to take greater responsibility for itself, a strategy the Trump administration has continued. That background explains current difficulties in the Washington-Berlin relationship, exacerbated by matters such as Iran, climate change, Nordstream 2, the adoption of Huawei 5G technology, trade wars and the ongoing 2 percent debate. Nevertheless, Germany remains the ally that can be the most effective partner for the US in addressing most of the major global issues faced – as long as they can figure out how to work together more closely. Why is that so?

“Made in Germany” is an internationally respected brand. Germany has earned a certain moral authority over the last several decades that provides diplomatic leverage in many trouble spots. It is the unquestioned leader of the EU and North America’s largest trading partner. Its economic power exceeds that of other European countries. As a framework nation, Germany assumes leadership tasks in NATO and encourages other countries to
intensify their cooperation with NATO. Furthermore, it has made a clear commitment to the security of its eastern neighbors, underpinned with its own military capabilities (Paulsen 2019). Germany continues to contribute to the alliance, demonstrated by its participation in joint Air Policing in the Baltic Region, a defense mission of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). Thanks to its good relations with Russia, Germany is the one country that could probably change Kremlin behavior.

The access that Germany provides to the US is essential to implementing Washington’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. This includes forward basing of troops necessary for the rapid reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank; Ramstein airbase – one of the largest in the world; Landstuhl Military Hospital; and the Headquarters for US European Command and US Africa Command, both of which are in Stuttgart. The ports of Bremerhaven and Hamburg; international airports at Munich, Nurnberg, Frankfurt and Berlin; and the rail network that would transport American capability, are also essential to the rapid reinforcement necessary for effective deterrence.

But when it comes to defense spending, Germany has been a particular target since President Trump’s election in 2016, culminating in a threat to withdraw US troops from Germany and demand that Berlin pay for the already guaranteed security and the stationing of US soldiers. (Vestring 2019). Hardly a week goes by without a debate or negative comment or criticism of Germany’s military readiness and its resistance to living up to the agreed 2 percent GDP goal. Under President Trump’s proposed conditions, Germany hypothetically owes NATO and the US immense amounts for its costly protection (The White House 2018). The characterization of this situation by the US administration has not been helpful or effective in Germany. To some extent, it has been counterproductive, and the projected amount of German GDP to be invested in defense will actually be lower at 2024 than today, even though real spending has increased (NATO 2019: 6 ff.).

After the Second World War, Germany developed an anti-militarist, pacifist culture making higher defense spending very controversial among both the public and politicians, including the current grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD). While the CDU is more favorable to raising defense spending, the SPD is following a very pacifist and non-militaristic approach to regain votes from the left. Intra-coalition frictions could lead to instability or even the coalition’s collapse. A politically unstable Germany cannot be in the interest of NATO and its members.

Despite such transatlantic differences, there must be a way for Germany to incentivize higher defense spending, and “move
the needle’ towards 2 percent in a way acceptable to the coalition government and parliament, eliminating a principal tension in US-German relations. The defense budget must therefore be distributed in such a way that Germans perceives it to be meaningful and of public benefit – such as via investment in infrastructure. That requires a more sophisticated approach to the 2 percent metric. What is required is a shift from a pure rearmament debate by spending more on defense towards a strengthening of capabilities and increase in readiness.

8.5 Germany Must Be Prepared and Ready

The security policy requirements on Europe and Germany have grown. The borders of eastern Europe, once considered safe, have not been since the annexation of the Crimea. Europe is threatened by terrorism on its continent and abroad. It risks getting between the front lines of the re-strengthened great power China, Russia and the US. As a leader in Europe and NATO, as a framework nation, fixing readiness must be the priority for Germany’s Ministry of Defense.

The Bundeswehr currently comprises 182,832 active soldiers. Since the end of the Cold War, it has continuously reduced its personnel and equipment. In fact, the German armed forces featured in several international headlines because of some equipment and weapons systems that were not fully operational or failed to reach NATO standards (Wiegold 2018). This is not due to officers’ inattention or that they somehow forgot how to do maintenance, training or simply lost interest. The decline in readiness stemmed from decisions made over a decade earlier, which the current Bundeswehr leadership is now working very hard to fix.

Among the remedies are cultural changes in the Defense Ministry – a process that began in recent years – to reinstall a “culture of readiness” and a necessary sense of urgency. That will need significant investment: lack of readiness or functionality poses a risk to the Alliance’s effectiveness and must be addressed.

Germany’s loss of operational readiness and significant underfunding, particularly in the last several years, cannot be ignored (Glatz and Zapfe 2017). The military’s new tasks and challenges require massive investment to compensate for the shortcomings of the past 20 years.

An increase in Germany’s defense budget to 2 percent of GDP would mean a rise from the current Euro 43.2 billion (BMVG 2019) to almost Euro 70 billion. The upsurge is seen by many German politicians as excessive and unnecessary. Moreover, Germany’s defense budget would significantly exceed that of France, which currently spends Euro 35.9 billion (Ministère des ArméesF 2019). Such a difference would create an uncomfortable financial and political im-
balance between the two countries. Hence suggestions in both countries for Germany instead to progress to a security policy in accordance with that of its neighbor. Strategic and political considerations should lead Germany and the alliance to find ways to spend money that improves overall capabilities, but without necessarily inflating the size of the Bundeswehr.

Instead of emphasizing paying «membership dues», the alliance should focus on greater strategic cohesion. Burden-sharing also entails intelligent and targeted spending to enhance member states’ capabilities and to create a real military advantage.

Also, not to be forgotten is hybrid warfare, such as cyber warfare, which occurs below the threshold of an armed conflict, and which is becoming increasingly important. Cyberspace threats are becoming more frequent and complex and have immense destructive potential that could lead to a declaration of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, based on recent statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Since everybody recognizes cyber represents a significant threat to the collective security of the alliance, investment in cyber protection and defense should count towards the 2 percent target. Some nations, such as Lithuania and Latvia, have already taken steps to protect critical transport and government infrastructure, counting towards their 2 percent. Why not Germany?

Increased German investment in cyberdefense would protect vital infrastructure, such as the port of Bremerhaven and airports like Munich and Nurnberg, and the rail network, all of which are extremely important to NATO defense planning and rapid-reinforcement capabilities. It would also be a significant contribution to the collective security of NATO allies. Building on Secretary General Stoltenberg’s ideas, Germany could offer specialized education for university students, encourage recruitment for cyber experts and support further research in the field – all of which could be considered part of its 2 percent investment in collective security (Stoltenberg 2019).

Achieving and maintaining leadership in cyberspace requires technological expansion through innovative research and development. Germany has an impressive number of research organizations and academic institutions. Perhaps the Federal Government could support the establishment of a center for “disruptive technologies” – a German version of the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In the US, the Department of Defense hopes to get at least a 10 percent return on its multimillion-dollar investment in new technologies – which of course counts towards US defense investment. Why not Germany?

Doing so would foster R&D at the security and defense policy level which – in
accordance with the EU’s dual use principle – could also have civilian benefits. That would also demonstrate Germany’s commitment to the 20 percent modernization guideline and compensate for the lack of defense innovation.

Unfortunately, many German universities prohibit research contributing to capabilities needed by the Bundeswehr or German participation in collective defense. A more sophisticated approach would give Germany credit towards its 2 percent investment for research in dual-use projects such as lightweight materials, medical treatment for traumatic wounds, artificial intelligence, cyber, and digitalization.

Another essential concept potentially benefitting from a more sophisticated definition of the 2 percent guideline would be «deterrence through speed». Deterrence depends on having the demonstrated capability to defeat any potential adversary and the demonstrated will to use that capability if or when necessary. Essential to this capability is “speed”: speed of recognition, speed of decision, and speed of assembly. If an adversary believes it can move faster than NATO can recognize what is happening, decide to respond and then assemble the necessary capabilities to defeat it, then the risk of a terrible miscalculation by this adversary increases markedly. So, having “speed” is essential to effective deterrence, giving our civilian leaders options other than a liberation campaign into the sovereign territory of a NATO ally.

For NATO forces to move rapidly from one location to the next – what NATO and the EU refer to as “military mobility”, they need legal and diplomatic clearances eased. In other words, they need a “military Schengen zone.” Fortunately, both NATO and EU staffs are working on this. Indeed, Military Mobility is one of the 17 projects under the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework, with the Netherlands as lead nation. In addition to a Schengen-like framework, member states require the transportation infrastructure and capacity to accommodate significant volumes of military traffic. This of course means expanding and strengthening roads and bridges. Modern main battle tanks, such as Germany’s Leopard and the US Abrams, weigh between 70 and 80 tons. There are multiple rivers to be crossed between Germany and Latvia, for example, as well as hundreds of lakes and smaller bodies of water across northern Poland’s Masurian region. These are real obstacles to rapid movement for NATO forces. Rail transportation is also a challenge: Germany’s Deutsche Bahn Cargo currently has sufficient heavy wagons for transporting the equipment for only 1.5 armored brigades simultaneously. In a crisis, each allied nation would be competing for that scarce critical transportation capability.
Why not count improvements to dual-use roads, bridges and rail capabilities and capacities that have demonstrated real military necessity in the 2 percent framework? Such assets are surely essential for NATO’s concept of defense, based on smaller forward deployed forces, such as the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups currently deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, and on the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) which would bring armored units from all over Europe. Financial resources from the defense budgets of the member states could be allocated to this purpose.

There are several ways to make Germany fit again for NATO. Instead of allocating blame, we should concentrate on short-term improvements, while also seeking long-term solutions. This must be our course of action for a unified and cohesive alliance. It is time to take the next steps. Other alliance members are watching Berlin. If Germany leads by example, then most every other will follow.

Germany is the most important ally of the United States. Both are united by a long-standing, strong bond of friendship shaped by common values. The strategic importance of military facilities for the US persists. It is therefore important to recognize Germany’s performance in its entirety. Although one should not ignore the debate about defense funding, it is vital to address the issue, not as a simple number, but holistically. Defense is far more than the mere number of weapons systems, tanks, ships or airplanes a nation may have.

**Intelligent and targeted spending**

Burden-sharing also implies an intelligent and targeted way to spend a country’s defense budget and to enhance member states’ capabilities and create a real military advantage. Creating better strategic cohesion with and between member states is key.

**Reliance on solid infrastructure and sound training**

A solid infrastructure, excellent training and equipment, interoperability and capacity building are also crucial for Europe’s military strength and operational readiness. This applies to Germany, but also to all other European countries and NATO members.

**Changing the narrative**

But until we can resolve or at least improve the issue of Germany and its unwillingness or inability to at least make progress towards 2 percent target, that narrative will dominate the relationship and threaten the alliance’s cohesion and the relationship between these two great friends. So let’s change the narrative.
Literature


Conclusion

By Pascal Lago, Avenir Suisse, Switzerland

The contributions from various countries in this collection show European security policy integration is not stymied by inadequate financial or technological resources, but organizational and political inefficiencies. It is less a matter of how much Europe spends on defense as of “on what”. A European defense policy independent of the US – say on Russia – would be both financially and technologically possible. The combined GDPs of NATO’s European members are 10 times higher than Russia’s, while the aggregate defense spending of the 28 EU member states in 2018 was four and a half times higher.

Europe’s newly created defense initiatives should be seen as an attempt to fill the strategic gap left by Washington’s disengagement as an alliance partner. But to achieve real strategic autonomy, Europe needs technological (armament policy) and institutional (alliance policy) interoperability.

This wish is highly charged politically – as demonstrated by the contributions to this report. European states have highly diverse security policy interests, depending on their geographic location (east or south), or claims in terms of integration (European security policy sovereignty versus compatibility with the US/NATO). That is why the process of security policy integration suffers problems of legitimacy, efficiency and implementation. The results are coordination in “bi- and minilateralisms”, that occur outside the formal mechanisms of common foreign and security policy. The famous example here is France’s proposed European Intervention Initiative, which would include members beyond the EU and NATO to develop a common strategic culture. There are also other ideas for the future configuration of European defense, including a European army, or approaches that focus more on capability development to avoid unnecessarily irritating Washington with talk of a European army.

Reading the contributions in this collection inevitably prompts the question of how far Europe wants to – and can – disengage itself from the US in terms of security policy. It is argued that this dilemma can be resolved through a good narrative:
one option, for instance, could be to signal to NATO and the US that European self-sufficiency will be complementary to the former and not undermine it. That could be done, for example through more equitable burden sharing with the US and with the emphasis not on inputs (money), but outputs (capabilities and operational commitments). It should be emphasized here that currently the US is not seriously questioning its security guarantees to Europe. But the fact that the transatlantic waters are still troubled is reflected in Washington’s constant stress on the 2 percent debate (cf. chapter 8 in this report). The latter could be interpreted positively as an invitation by Washington to cooperate. Conversely, the debate will remain fruitless as long as there is no answer to the question of what should then be done with the additional funds committed.

From a Swiss perspective, the view of various authors in this collection that Europe needs to re-engage in serious, collective strategic thinking is particularly telling. Likewise that greater self-sufficiency in defense can be a goal that would come about on the European continent primarily thanks to more transnational cooperation.

As chapter 1 has shown, federal Switzerland is also currently unclear about its strategic way forward. As a small country at the heart of Europe, the new security outlook regarding threats makes national security dependent on transnational security in Europe as a whole. So it would be eminently important for the Swiss public to know what and how Switzerland should defend itself against, and also to be told what expected benefits would accrue from what costs.

A clear strategic direction also signposts how Switzerland could in future become more proactive to benefit collective security in Europe. It remains to be seen whether a fundamental discussion on the character of Swiss neutrality will and must take place or not. What is certain is that, thanks to a clearer security policy course, Switzerland could increasingly bring its strengths to bear on the international stage. What is important here is a holistic understanding of security, that includes the civil authorities and political institutions alongside the military. Switzerland’s outstanding diplomatic services have already settled many international conflicts in recent years through negotiations on Swiss soil. Switzerland can guarantee its own security precisely because of its contributions to collective security in Europe.
Literature


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